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OUT OF THE MORASS: THE MOVE TO STATE FUNDING
OF THE ARKANSAS COURT SYSTEM
James D. Gingerich*
I. INTRODUCTION
For at least the last twenty years, the issue of the funding and
financing of the Arkansas court system has been debated by public
officials at both the state and county levels. County officials have
decried the burden of the growing cost of trial courts and, while
obtaining significant amounts of revenue from the courts to fund
local programs, have recently challenged the current funding system
by initiating litigation against the state.' State legislators have re-
sponded to the issue by giving the state an increased role in the
funding of several trial court programs, but have failed to take any
comprehensive action. Like county officials, state officials also have
looked to the courts for funding of many state and local programs,
some of which have little or no connection to the courts.
Trial judges are vitally interested in the issue of state funding
but have not been uniform in their position. Those judges in relatively
wealthy counties express their concern that their financial support
will diminish with state assumption of funding, while those in poorer
counties that receive little support believe they have much to gain.
Many judges also express concerns about both the practical problems
associated with court costs and fines-the court must become a
collection agency-and the ethical dilemma of becoming a "revenue
raising" agency. Court clerks are interested in the issue because of
their statutorily assigned duty of accounting for, collecting, and
disbursing all court revenues. 2 The complexity and confusion that
surround the current state law makes this a very difficult task.
Municipal officials recently became more interested in the issue
due to the filing of class action suits against several cities. The
actions alleged that the improper assessment and collection of costs
constituted an illegal exaction, and also that court fees were un-
* Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts in Arkansas; B.A.,
University of Central Arkansas; J.D., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville; LL.M.,
University of Bristol, England. Mr. Gingerich is a former associate professor of
political science at the University of Central Arkansas and is active in the National
Center for State Courts.
1. Villines v. Tucker, No. 93-4216 (Pulaski County Ch. Ct., 6th Div., filed
July 8, 1993) (pending before Judge Annabelle Imber).
2. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-20-106 to -108 (Michie 1987).
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constitutional.' Finally, members of the public have become interested
and, in some cases, angry over the issue of court funding. They
are concerned with the excessive costs required to gain access to
civil courts or added to the expense of criminal and traffic cases.
In addition, some citizens are troubled about the huge variation in
the quality of court services provided, based upon where one lives
within the state.4
This paper brings together all of the information relative to the
financing of courts in Arkansas and serves as a catalyst for discussion
and possible change in the law. It includes a review of the history
of state court funding in the United States and Arkansas and com-
pares Arkansas's system with that of other states. A description of
the current funding scheme with a detailed account of the current
court costs and filing fee system also is included. Several alternative
models of state court financing are reviewed, with comments con-
cerning the advantages and disadvantages of each. Finally, a brief
proposal for reform of the Arkansas system is presented.
II. STATE COURT FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES5
The history of the sources and percentages of funding for state
courts in the United States shows a pattern consistent with that of
other areas of major public funding-there has been a move away
from local funding and toward state and federal funding. In almost
all states, the local government originally was responsible for fi-
nancing of state courts. Like the funding for schools, roads, and
public assistance, court funding was solely a local responsibility,
generally funded by property taxes. With the proliferation of New
Deal programs, the federalization of many issues, and the huge
growth in the availability of both state and federal funds, there has
been a concomitant decline in both the revenues available to and
the oVersignht ^epniblt f local - -
3. For an example of the litigation, see Nathaniel v. City of Little Rock, No.
91-2525 (Pulaski County Ch. Ct., 5th Div.). The cities of Conway, El Dorado,
Fayetteville, Fort Smith, Jonesboro, Pine Bluff, Rogers, Russelville, Springdale,
Texarkana, and West Memphis faced similar litigation.
4. In a comparative study of the municipal courts in 1991, it was found that
court costs (surcharges) in traffic cases ranged from $34.25 to $62.25, in criminal
cases from $39.25 to $81.25, in drug cases from $89.25 to $131.25, and in DWI
cases from $289.25 to $341.25. DivISION OF LEGISLATIVE AUDIT, CERTAIN MUNICIPAL
COURT FINES AND COSTS ASSESSED AS OF FEBRUARY 19, 1991, IN THE ARKANSAS
MUNICIPAL COURTS OF PULASKI COUNTY, PINE BLUFF AND HOPE (1991).
5. Much of the background information for this section is taken from ROBERT
TOBIN & JOHN HUDZIK, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE STATUS AND
FUTURE OF STATE FINANCING OF COURTS (1989).
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In the early move from local to state funding of courts, the
funding issue was only one part of a broader call for court reform.
Roscoe Pound, in his famous 1906 address to the American Bar
Association, sounded the initial call for a critical look at the structure
and organization of state court systems. 6 In other writings he noted
the need to address three areas: (1) the arrangement of judicial
personnel, (2) the structure of courts, and (3) the organization of
judicial administration. 7 He called for the "unification" of each of
these areas. Since Professor Pound's early work, numerous writers
and organizations have contributed to the literature on court uni-
fication. There is now general agreement that court unification con-
sists of five basic elements: (1) consolidation and simplification of
court structure, (2) centralized management, (3) centralized rule mak-
ing, (4) centralized budgeting, and (5) state financing. 8
Over the past half century, the trend in the United States has
been toward an increasing degree of unification in state court systems;
especially between 1960 and 1980, many states moved to adopt unified
court systems. The overriding motivation for most of these changes
was a "good government" platform of streamlining and centralizing
court structures to produce a simpler, more uniform, and more
efficient court system. While state financing and budgeting were
viewed as important parts of the court unification equation, however,
they were not deemed to be mandatory additions. For example, New
Jersey, Illinois, Idaho, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are states that
created structurally unified courts but did not adopt centralized state
funding.
During the late 1970s, critics began to raise questions about
some of the underlying premises for unification. 9 They argued that
state court structures that were staffed by judge-professionals even
at the lowest court levels were not suited for the hierarchical structure
and management principles called for by unification. They noted
that the use of central management principles resulted in poor morale,
6. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice, in 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 178 (1937).
7. Roscoe Pound, Organization of Courts, 11 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 69,
78 (1927).
8. BARRY MAHONY & HARVEY SOLOMON, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE 44 (Fannie J. Klein ed., 6th ed. 1981).
9. See Geoff Gallas, Court Reform: Has it Been Built on an Adequate Foun-
dation?, 63 JUDICATURE 28 (1979); see also Geoff Gallas, The Conventional Wisdom
of State Court Administration: A Critical Assessment and an Alternative Approach,
2 JUST. SYS. J. 35 (1976); John K. Hudzik, Rethinking the Consequences of State
Financing, 10 JUST. SYS. J. 135 (1985).
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less flexibility, and too much bureaucracy as these principles took
control away from local officials who were, in most cases, better
equipped to deal with the problems.
Despite these claims, the unification movement continued during
the 1980s, fostered by a new motivation- fiscal relief for local
governments. As the number of state court cases exploded and
became more complex, the number of judges increased.' 0 Emphasis
on new kinds of cases, such as juvenile, foster care, and child
support, required a larger and more sophisticated court staff; no
longer did the court system merely consist of judges and their court
reporters. For instance, during a six year period the average county
payroll expenditures for trial courts increased 153076, while overall
judicial costs doubled." Local governments, faced with a decreasing
revenue base, could not support the system and became the primary
proponents of state funding. 2 Accordingly, the earliest states to
adopt court unification and state financing tended to be the less
populated and politically progressive ones.' 3 Then, major cities in
New York, Michigan, Massachusetts, and California, which previ-
ously had fought state court financing because of a loss of local
control, moved toward state financing during the 1980s, as they
were hit with local financial crises. 4
Table One provides, for the fifty states and the District of
Columbia, those parts of state trial court expenditures that are
assumed by the state. 5 In thirteen of the fifty-one jurisdictions, the
state assumes virtually all of the costs of the trial court system.' 6
In another eight states, the state assumes the costs for everything
except court facilities. 7 On the other end of the spectrum, six states
provide for only a percentage of the judges' salaries, with all other
costs assumed by local government.' The remaining jurisdictions,
10. TOBIN & HUDZIK, supra note 5, at 5.
11. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1983 (Edward Brown et al. eds., 1984).
12. TOBIN & HUDZIK, supra note 5, at 6.
13. TOBIN & HUDZIK, supra note 5, at 6.
14. TOBIN & HUDZIK, supra note 5, at 6.
15. See infra Table 1.
16. These jurisdictions include Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Co-
lumbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, Utah, and Vermont.
17. These states are Alabama, Colorado, Maine, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oregon, and South Dakota.
18. The states in this category are Arizona, California, Michigan, Ohio, Texas,
and Washington.
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including Arkansas, have funding schemes placing them somewhere
between the two extremes.
III. EXPENDITURES FOR STATE COURTS IN ARKANSAS
On November 8, 1836, five months after Arkansas was accepted
into the Union, 19 the first General Assembly enacted an unnumbered
act which specifically appropriated funds to pay the "salaries of the
judges of the Supreme Court and the circuit judges." 2 All other
costs for the court system were borne by city and county governments.
Since that time, the courts have continued to secure most of their
funding from local sources, with limited but slightly expanding
participation by the state.
Table Two sets out the appropriations for the Arkansas judicial
system for fiscal year 1993-94.21 Currently, state government is the
sole funding source for the salaries and expenses of appellate and
trial court judges. 22 In addition, the state funds the operational costs
of the Arkansas Supreme Court, the Arkansas Court of Appeals,
and the Administrative Office of the Courts. 23 Since 1981, the state
has assumed the cost of the salaries of all official court reporters
and appropriates funds for their travel expense allowance, indigent
transcripts fees, and substitute court reporter salaries. 24 In 1989, the
state began to fund the cost of one-half of the salaries of all juvenile
intake and probation officers. Beginning in 1993, the state now funds
the salaries of three case coordinators for trial court judges. Other
court related expenses assumed by the state include the salaries of
all prosecuting attorneys and one deputy prosecutor in Jefferson
County, as well as the operation of the Prosecutor Coordinator's
Office, the Attorney General's Office, the Public Defender Com-
mission, the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, and the
Sentencing Commission.
19. See Act for the Admission of the State of Arkansas to the Union, ch. 100,
§ 1, 5 Stat. 50 (1836).
20. Unnumbered Act, 1836 Ark. Acts 197.
21. See infra Table 2.
22. See infra Table 2.
23. See infra Table 2.
24. The state's payment of the costs of the salaries of court reporters is funded
through a special revenue court cost. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-6-404 to -405 (Michie
Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-20-107 (Michie 1987). In the event the special
revenue is not sufficient, the state deducts funding from the county's turn-back
appropriation. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-511 (Michie 1993). The shortfall in fiscal
1993 was $2,881,652. It is incorrect, therefore, to assert that court reporters' salaries
are now the full responsibility of the state even though they are treated, for all
purposes, as state employees.
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In the discussion of state court funding, one critically important
issue that is sometimes overlooked is the definition and scope of
the "judicial system." Functions that are considered a part of the
judiciary in one state are assigned to the executive branch in other
states, and within a state there may be disagreement as to the proper
characterization of certain functions. The official biennial budget
published by the State of Arkansas, for example, lists within the
definition of "judicial offices" the budgets of the Administrative
Office of the Courts, the Attorney General, the Arkansas Code
Revision Commission, the Arkansas Court of Appeals, the Arkansas
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, the Prosecutor Co-
ordinator, and the Arkansas Supreme Court. 25 This list includes
funds for agencies that are not generally considered judicial offices,
and excludes the salaries of some judicial officers such as trial and
appellate judges.
The budget section of the annual reports published by the
Administrative Office of the Courts is much more restrictive. 26 It
includes salaries for the judiciary but excludes salaries for prose-
cutors, defense attorneys, and the Attorney General. 27 Indeed, in
many states those functions are considered a part of the executive
rather than the judicial branch. In this context, the argument may
be one of semantics in that the state is already assuming the cost
of these operations. When discussing the possibility of expanded
state funding, however, knowing whether prosecution, defense, and
other services are within the definition becomes critical. Table Two
assumes a more expansive definition of "court system" and attempts
to show all current state expenditures for court and court-related
agencies .28
In 1993-94, the state budgeted $41,748,834 for its portion of
the cost of the judicial system. 29 The funds appropriated to the
courts accordingly represent less than .5% of the total state gov-
ernment appropriation, which totaled over $9 billion in 1993-94.30
A now somewhat dated survey by the U.S. Department of Justice
placed Arkansas 48th out of the 50 states and the District of
25. DEPARTMENT OF FIN. & ADMIN., ARKANSAS BIENNIAL BUDGET 1993-1995
(1993).
26. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ARKANSAS JUDICIARY ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1992-1993 (1993).
27. Id.
28. See infra Table 2.
29. DEPARTMENT OF FIN. & ADMIN., ARKANSAS BIENNIAL BUDGET 1993-1995
(1993).
30. DEPARTMENT OF FIN. & ADMIN., ARKANSAS BIENNIAL BUDGET 1993-1995
(1993).
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Columbia in the percentage of total state funds dedicated to justice
and court activities.3
County government is the funding source for the salaries of
circuit, chancery, and probate court support and clerical staff, and
provides money for all supplies, equipment, utilities, and facilities
within each judicial circuit. Each county within the circuit provides
funding according to its pro rata share of the district-wide court
expenses and is solely responsible for the cost of facilities and utilities
within the county. County government pays all expenses of the
county court, court of common pleas, and justice of the peace
courts. The county government also shares with city government the
cost of the municipal court. The county share is usually 50010,2 but
there are numerous exceptions to this pattern in a variety of locally
negotiated arrangements.
There is no separate reporting or auditing conducted at the state
level that would allow one to determine the total county expenditures
for the judicial system. In addition, no definition exists at the county
level as to what should be included within the "judicial system."
A special audit of county government expenditures for court related
costs conducted by the Division of Legislative Audit in 1988 showed
that the total outlay by all 75 counties was $18,846,967.13. 3a Other
reports have found that counties spent over $3,600,000 on the salaries
and expenses of deputy prosecuting attorneys,3 4 $2,339,414 on the
salaries of case coordinators,35 $388,108 on the salaries of law clerks,36
almost $3,000,000 on the expenses of public defenders or private
defense counsel,37 and $970,090 on the counties' share of salaries
for juvenile intake and probation officers. No reliable statewide data
exists on county expenditures for construction and maintenance of
facilities, including courtrooms and offices for judges and other
31. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1990 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy Flanagan eds.,
1991).
32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-115 (Michie 1987).
33. DIVISION OF LEGISLATIVE AUDIT, CERTAIN 1988 COURT REVENUES COLLECTED
By ARKANSAS COUNTIES AND CERTAIN 1988 CALENDAR YEAR ARKANSAS COUNTY
AND 1989 FISCAL YEAR ARKANSAS STATE GOVERNMENT FUNDED COURT EXPENDITURES
(1991).
34. PROSECUTOR COORDINATOR'S OFFICE, ARKANSAS PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS
1991 SALARY AND EXPENSES SURVEY (1991).
35. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CURRENT AND PROPOSED STAFFING
ASSISTANCE FOR ARKANSAS TRIAL COURTS (1992).
36. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ARKANSAS TRIAL COURTS STAFFING
AND SALARY SUMMARY (1991).
37. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, PROVIDING LEGAL COUNSEL FOR
INDIGENT CRIMIPTAL DEFENDANTS IN ARKANSAS (1991).
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court-related staff, or operating expenses, such as furniture and
equipment, utilities, office supplies, and travel expenses.
City government is the funding source for the remainder of
municipal court expenses not covered by county government and
provides the sole support for city courts. There is no reliable data
available at the state level showing total expenditures by municipal
governments for courts and court-related expenses.
IV. REVENUES PRODUCED BY STATE COURTS IN ARKANSAS
While the issue of the costs of the judicial system is frequently
discussed and often lamented by local and state executive and leg-
islative officials, most remain unaware of the revenues produced by
the courts. One reason, of course, for this lack of information is
that the various funding mechanisms are so confusing, overlapping,
conflicting, and numerous that any understanding of the full revenue
picture is almost impossible to achieve. A more compelling reason,
however, may be that a few state and local agencies and officials
have discovered that court fees can produce a significant and constant
source of revenue which, once established, is never again questioned.
In most cases the revenue escapes the review of the city council,
the quorum court, or the General Assembly and moves directly into
the coffers of a particular agency or program. Rather than objecting
to the loss of control over the funds, members of the General
Assembly seem to appreciate this "painless" method of producing
revenue for a favorite program without having to increase the general
tax base or take funds away from other general revenue programs.
This has led to the current morass for the court system in which
the court fees have become so numerous as to make the adminis-
tration of the system by the courts impossible; yet reform of the
system is barred by a few powerful interests which receive revenue
from the courts and actively resist change, aided by a legislative
body that has little motivation for change.
Just as there is some confusion and disagreement as to which
parts of the system to include in the discussion of the costs of the
judicial system, some consensus must be reached as to the types
and sources of revenue to be included. There are numerous charges
which are assessed during the adjudication process in an Arkansas
court. Some of these are paid directly to the court and others are
not. Some relate to the actual cost of providing the court services,
but many do not.
In a national study of court fees published in 1986 by the
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Conference of State Court Administrators (COSCA),38 it was noted
that achieving a common definition is problematic and that, from
state to state, the words "costs," "fees," and "surcharges" were
either undefined, defined but used inconsistently, or used inter-
changeably. After a thorough review, the following definitions were
proposed:
Fees - Amounts charged for the performance of a particular
court service which are dispersed to a governmental entity. These
fees are specified by an authority at a fixed amount.
COMMENTARY
"Fees" are the amounts charged for services performed by the
court. A fixed amount is charged for the service and the recipient
of the revenue is a governmental entity. Examples of "fees" are:
access to the court or filing fee, motion fee, answer fee, certificate
fee, and jury fee. These fees pass through the court's registries
and are ultimately deposited to the funding source(s) of the court
either in state or county general revenue funds with the intent
of offsetting, in part, the expense of the benefit or service provided
by the court.
Miscellaneous Charges - Amounts assessed that ultimately com-
pensate individuals or non-court entities for services relating to
the process of litigation. These amounts often vary from case to
case based upon the services provided.
COMMENTARY
"Miscellaneous charges" are the amounts assessed for services
provided by individuals or entities other than the court. For
example, a sheriff's fees and mileage for service of process may
be paid to a county or directly to the sheriff. Most often the
recipient of revenues from miscellaneous charges is the individual
performing the service. The amount of the charge or the rate
per unit of service may or may not be established by statute or
court rule. The per page rate for a transcript may be set by
statute. The number of pages prepared depends upon the length
of the hearing to be transcribed. Typical miscellaneous charges
not established by statute or court rule might be professional
fees, i.e., attorneys or psychiatrists. Other examples of "miscel-
laneous charges" are expenses for sequestration of jurors, extra-
dition expenses, deposition expenses, professional witness expenses,
and juror and witness mileage expenses.
Surcharges - Amounts added to fines, fees, or court costs that
are used for designated purposes.
38. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT COSTS AND FEES, MISCELLANEOUS CHARGES
AND SURCHARGES AND A NATIONAL SURVEY OF PRACTICE (Jane Hess ed., 1986).
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COMMENTARY
"Surcharges" are certain add on charges with the revenues
generated earmarked for specific purposes. Presently these funds
are most often passed through the court's registries and disbursed
directly into an account that may be expended only for the purpose
that has been earmarked either at the state or local level....
Although "surcharge" is the most appropriate label, in some
states these charges are deductions from flat filing fees. Examples
of surcharges are law library funds, domestic shelter funds, re-
tirement funds for judges, state police and sheriffs, funds for
indigent defense, law enforcement halls of fame funds, specific
funds for departments of transportation, funds identified for
departments of health and social services, victims of crime funds,
and innumerable training funds for law enforcement, prosecutors
and others, and funds for buildings and facilities.
Court Costs - Amounts assessed against a party or parties in
litigation. Such amounts are determined on a case by case basis
and vary in relation to the activities involved in the course of
litigation. Court costs include fees, miscellaneous charges and
surcharges.
COMMENTARY
"Court costs" are the total taxable assessments in a case. Within
a given case, a mathematical equation may be used to express
''court costs." The equation is: fees plus miscellaneous charges
plus surcharges equal court costs.
Using these definitions, Arkansas currently has several statutory
provisions that fall into each category designated in the COSCA
study. The most common Arkansas "fee" is the uniform advance
fee assessed in circuit, chancery, probate, and municipal courts.3 9
Examples of "miscellaneous fees" in Arkansas include the court
reporter's transcript fee, 40 the sheriff's service fee, 4' and several
miscellaneous clerk's fees. 42 "Surcharges" are the most numerous
pv,,sos i- the Arkansas Code and are charged at all levels for
all types of cases.
One other major source of revenue produced by state courts is
found in the criminal fines and penalties that are assessed and
collected statewide. The Arkansas Criminal Code43 sets out a general
framework for fines, but there are hundreds of specific fines and
39. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-6-403(a), -404 (Michie Supp. 1993).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-2-217 (Michie 1987).
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-307 (Michie 1987).
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-14-105(b) (Michie 1987); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-
6-402, -406 (Michie 1987).
43. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-101 to -75-107 (Michie 1993).
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civil penalties contained in other sections of the Arkansas Code.
The general rule for the distribution of fine revenue is that it flows
to the general fund account of the city or county, depending upon
the court assessing the fine.44 There are, however, certain fines that
are directed by law to a specific county or local program45 or to
state agencies. 46 Because almost all fine revenue is assessed locally
and disbursed to the local government, there is a dearth of state-
wide information available on the amount of revenue collected. Other
sources of revenue produced by the state courts include adult pro-
bation fees, 47 juvenile probation fees, 48 restitution, 49 contempt fees,50
and criminal forfeitures."
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT ARKANSAS FEES AND SURCHARGES
There are three general types of fees and surcharges statutorily
authorized in Arkansas.12 The first group consists of uniform fees
and surcharges requiring collection in all state courts. They are
identified in Table Three as "mandatory." 53 A second group of
optional charges may be applied statewide, but require assessment
by the local quorum court or city council.54 In many cases, the
General Assembly has established a fee range instead of a set amount,
with local discretion to set fees within the statutory range.5 These
44. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-113 (Michie 1987).
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-20-116 (Michie Supp. 1993) (setting aside fines for
the County Youth Accident Foundation).
46. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-41-209 (Michie 1994) (distributing fine
revenue to the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission); ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-33-
113 (Michie Supp. 1993) (distributing 80% of fine and penalty revenue to Arkansas
Livestock and Poultry Commission).
47. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-303(g), -322(a) (Michie 1993); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-17-125 (Michie 1994).
48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-326 (Michie 1994).
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205 (Michie 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-331(d)
(Michie 1993).
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-108(b)(1) (Michie 1994); see also ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-65-115, -307(c)(2) (Michie 1993).
51. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(a) (Michie 1993).
52. As a general rule, fees and surcharges can only be imposed and recovered
where there is some statutory authority for the assessments. The Arkansas Supreme
Court has stated: "We have often held that the allowance of costs is purely statutory
.... "Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. Kizer, 222 Ark. 673, 677, 262 S.W.2d
265, 267 (1953). The courts, therefore, have no implied or inherent power to award
fees and surcharges. While the power to impose such costs must ultimately be
found in some statute, the legislature may nevertheless grant the power in general
terms to the courts, which in turn may make rules or orders under which the costs
may be taxed or imposed. Thus, while the issue of fees and surcharges has a
profound impact on the courts, the courts themselves are powerless to resolve the
problem. Instead, the matter requires a legislative solution.
53. See infra Table 3.
54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-705(a) (Michie 1994).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-411(b) (Michie 1987).
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are identified in Table Three as "optional" costs. 56 The third group
of fees and surcharges includes a number of special acts that establish
fees and surcharges only applying in one county or municipality or,
in some cases, one court. These provisions are very difficult to locate
because almost all remain uncodified.7
Fees and surcharges also can be differentiated based upon the
type of case or court to which they apply. Each code provision
authorizing a fee or surcharge usually describes the type of case
and court to which it applies. Many, however, do not, and of those
that do, inconsistent language is used to describe the classification
of cases."' While the meaning is clear when the statute specifies that
the surcharges apply to "felony" or "misdemeanor" cases, confusion
surrounds descriptions like "criminal cases," "traffic cases," or
"moving vehicle cases." Usually, there is special language in the
legislation providing that, in addition to the particular court and
type of case, other conditions must be present before the fee or
surcharge will apply. Most criminal court surcharges, for example,
provide that the cost will only be applied when there has been a
"conviction, a guilty or nolo plea, or a bond forfeiture." 5 9 The
language in some provisions, however, lists "convictions" but fails
56. See infra Table 3.
57. Many court cost provisions exist which impose or authorize court costs in
specific cities, counties, or judicial districts. The validity of these acts is questionable
and may be subject to challenge based on Amendment 14 of the Arkansas Con-
stitution. The Amendment prohibits the passage of any "local or special" act.
ARK. Co NsT. amend. XIV. The Arkansas Supreme Court struck down Act 616 of
1975 on this basis. See Littleton v. Blanton, 281 Ark. 395, 665 S.W.2d 239 (1984).
Act 616 provided that "any municipality of the first class located in any county
having a population of not less than 26,500 nor more than 28,000, according to
the 1970 Federal Census, may establish a municipal court." Id. at 397, 665 S.W.2d
at 240. The population restriction made the Act applicable only to Poinsett County,
ruling out eligbility fr nany other county. The court stated that "statutes relating
to the administration of justice will no longer be held per se to be neither local
or special within the meaning of Amendment 14." Id. at 405, 665 S.W.2d at 244.
See infra Table 4 for a listing of all the special or local fees in existence.
58. In an attempt to deal with this problem, the General Assembly enacted
"An Act to Provide for the Standardization of the Operative Language of Certain
Court Cost Statutes" in 1991. Act of Mar. 29, 1991, No. 904, 1991 Ark. Acts
2793 (codified in seventeen separate sections of the ARK. CODE ANN.). The Act
was part of the response of the Arkansas Municipal League to several class action
lawsuits pending against municipalities. The Act revised the language in seventeen
court cost provisions to provide that they were to apply in all felony, misdemeanor,
traffic violation, state law violation, and local ordinance violation cases, attempting
to standardize the language in each statute. The problem was that only a limited
number of the court cost statutes were included in the Act. Thus, many were left
out. Additionally, two new court cost statutes were enacted during the 1991 session,
and the wording in the new statutes conflicted with that in the uniform act.
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-64-603 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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to list "guilty pleas. ' ' 0 In others, "nolo pleas" are left out.6' Sim-
ilarly, in civil cases, special language in some instances applies to
all cases "filed," 62 but in others, terms such as the "filing of [the]
.. decree ' 6 3 or "each divorce or annulment granted"' '  are used.
Sorting out which of the forty or more separate fees and surcharges
may apply to any specific case is extremely difficult, especially in
high volume municipal courts where hundreds of cases may be
disposed of on a single morning.
Finally, fees and surcharges may be distinguished based on time
of collection. As a general rule, fees are collected at the time of
filing. Surcharges are collected at the time of judgment or conviction,
subject to certain exceptions. Thus, the distinction between civil and
criminal cases is important because fees and surcharges in civil cases
are usually assessed at the time of filing, while fees and surcharges
in criminal cases are assessed at the time of judgment or conviction.65
Until 1977, filing fees in Arkansas trial courts differed greatly
from county to county due to each court's assessment of the com-
bination of uniform, optional, and special fees. Then, in 1977, the
General Assembly adopted the Uniform Fee Act, which established
a uniform filing fee for all actions in circuit and chancery courts.
6
Under the Act, all of the individual fees authorized and collected
as of March 1, 1977, were not abolished but were to be paid from
the proceeds of the uniform fee. 67 All excess funds were deposited
into the county general fund.6 Similar legislation established a uni-
form fee for probate courts in 1983.69
The uniform fees now in place are $30 in civil and chancery
cases, 70 and $75 in probate cases. 7' One major exception to the
60. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-41-204(b) (Michie 1994) (providing a "fee
of ten dollars ($10.00) for each conviction . . ").
61. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-110(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993) (collecting
"one dollar ($1.00) from each defendant as costs upon each judgment of conviction
and upon each plea of guilty . . ").
62. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-123(b)(1)(F) (Michie Supp. 1993).
63. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-123(b)(1)(C) (Michie Supp. 1993).
64. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-502(a), (c) (Michie 1991).
65. One of the bases for the litigation filed against municipalities for improper
assessments of court costs was that criminal surcharges were being assessed for
suspended sentences or bond forfeitures, when no conviction had been entered.
Nathaniel v. City of Little Rock, No. 91-2525 (Pulaski County Ch. Ct., 5th Div.).
66. Act to Establish Uniform Fees to be Charged by the Clerks of Circuit and
Chancery Courts, 1977 Ark. Acts 333 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403
(Michie Supp. 1993)).
67. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403(c)(1)-(3) (Michie Supp. 1993).
68. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-25-102 to -103 (Michie 1987).
69. Act to Establish Uniform Advance Fees for Clerks of County and Probate
Courts, 1983 Ark. Acts 898 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-14-105 (Michie
1993)).
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403(a)(1)-(2) (Michie Supp. 1993).
71. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-14-103(a)(1) (Michie 1994).
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uniform fee is the additional advanced fee for the court reporter
fund,7 2 which is added to the uniform fee in civil and chancery
matters and raises the total fee to $50. 71 The court reporter advance
fee is part of the $75 uniform fee in probate cases and is deducted
from the uniform fee rather than added to it.74
While the uniform fee was intended to standardize state court
filing fees, it has failed to do so. The reason for the failure is two-
fold. First, the statute permits variances in the uniform fee in that
new fees authorized after 1977 are added to the uniform fee in
circuit and chancery cases. New fees authorized after 1983 are added
to the uniform fee in probate cases. Because there have been several
new fees, many of which are optional, the uniform fees are no
longer "uniform." Second, the ambiguous language of the statute
subjects it to different interpretations. For example, several sur-
charges were authorized by statute prior to 1977, but then amended
to raise the amount of the fee after 1977. The language of the
Uniform Fee Act is unclear as to what amount of the surcharge,
if any, is taken out of the uniform fee and what amount is added
to it. 7 Various interpretations of this Act have created a disparity
in the amount of filing fees being charged.1 6
The fees in circuit, chancery, and probate courts are confusing
and less than uniform, but they are somewhat better than in mu-
nicipal, city, and police courts, where uniform fees have never existed.
The filing fee for the same type of case may differ from city to
city, and even from court to court within the same city, based upon
the combination of uniform, optional, and special fees which the
particular court has adopted. 77
71. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-14-103(a)(1) (Michie 1994).
-. A . A .... R , l -in ,_,,_, (Michie 1994): ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-
6-403(c)(1), -404(a) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993).
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-404 (Michie 1987).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-14-105(a)(3) (Michie 1994).
75. For example, the fee and surcharge for legal education were first adopted
in 1973 at a rate of $1.50 per case. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-64-603 (Michie Supp.
1993). The fee is specifically mentioned as being a part of the uniform advance
fee, but in 1989 the fee was raised to $5.00 per case. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-14-
105(a)(3) (Michie 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403(c)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993). It
is unclear whether any or all of the increased fee should be deducted from or
added to the advance fee.
76. Copies of court fee schedules submitted to the Administrative Office of the
Courts by municipal and trial court clerks indicate that in some locations the
uniform fee has been increased, while in others the additional fee has been deducted
from it.
77. See supra note 4.
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Statutorily authorized surcharges in Arkansas courts are currently
facing the same problem that trial court fees were facing prior to
1977-the amount of the surcharge differs in every court. In addition,
the numerous separate surcharges coupled with their large cumulative
amount often increases the assessment larger than the authorized
fine for the offense. 78 With the inconsistent language in the statute
and with as many as twenty different state, county, and local agencies
to which the surcharges are to be disbursed, the operation of the
system poses substantial burdens from accounting and administrative
standpoints.
VI. MOVING TOWARD A STATE FINANCED SYSTEM
Even though many states have ultimately decided to move from
a local to a state funded court system, the methods pursued and
the financing structure adopted as means of achieving that goal have
differed dramatically. The experience of other states indicates that
there are a number of diverse, yet successful, models available.
A. Direct Appropriation
The most comprehensive method of state financing is through
a direct appropriation to a state-level court agency for all state court
expenditures. In most highly unified states, there is a central state
budget for all court operations. Local courts file their budget requests
with a central office, usually the state supreme court or an office
of court administration, which then prepares and submits a unified
court budget to the legislative and executive branches. Whether this
system enhances the overall efficiency of the system and the availability
of revenues to the courts may depend upon the degree of discretion
given to the court agency. Some states receive a lump sum budget
that can be allocated where and when the need arises, while others
receive an appropriation with very narrow categories and limited
flexibility. 79
In less unified states, the direct appropriation is often utilized
to fund one specific item or category of court expenditures. In
Arkansas, for example, all judicial salaries,80 court reporter salaries,8"
78. See supra note 4.
79. HARRY 0. LAWSON, STATE FUNDING OF COURT SYSTEMS: AN INITIAL Ex-
AMINATION 131 (1979).
80. Appropriations Acts of Arkansas, 1993 Ark. Acts 4.
81. Appropriations Acts of Arkansas, 1993 Ark. Acts 391.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
and appellate court operations8 2 are funded through direct
appropriation.
Naturally, there are several advantages to the direct appropriation
approach. It allows the state to create a uniform and consistent
court system. All judges and court reporters in Arkansas, for example,
are paid from a uniform salary scale.83 The state can also create
minimum standards for employees and develop uniform management
controls. Centralized state funding can also be used to force changes
in inefficient local systems and practices. The lack of local control,
however, is often resented. Thus, any efficiency achieved at the local
level may be offset by an increased bureaucracy at the state level.
B. Discretionary Grants
Some states utilize a discretionary grant system to partially fund
the state court expenses.8 This system usually involves a requirement
for a local application and a competitive state level evaluation.85
Most often the system is used for one or more specific categories
or functions of court operations, or as an interim step in the move
from a locally funded system to a state funded system.8 6
For example, prior to 1993, the Arkansas Adult Probation
System was funded largely through discretionary state grants by the
Adult Probation Commission.8 7 Such a system allows a state to
accommodate those areas with the greatest need or reward those
that best use resources. This system also allows for continued local
control and investment in the expenditure of funds. It usually falls,
however, to bring consistency or uniformity in funding across the
state.
C. Block Grants
A more recent innovation in state court financing is the use of
block grants to cities or counties to offset the costs of the judicial
82. Act of Feb. 17, 1993, No. 144, 1993 Ark. Acts 419-A (Supreme Court);
Act of Mar. 24, 1993, No. 692, 1993 Ark. Acts 1055-A (Court of Appeals); Act
of Feb. 17, 1993, No. 143, 1993 Ark. Acts 414-A (Administrative Office of the
Courts).
83. ARK. CONST. of 1874, amend. XLII, § 1; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-501,
-503(b)(1) (Michie 1989).
84. TOBIN & HUDZIK, supra note 5, at 10.
85. TOBIN & HumziK, supra note 5, at 10.
86. TOBIN & HuDznc, supra note 5, at 10.
87. In 1993, the General Assembly abolished the Adult Probation Commission
and established the Department of Community Punishment. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-
27-125 (Michie Supp. 1993). Probation officers, who were previously county em-
ployees, became state employees. Probation fees that had been characterized as
county funds went into a state revolving fund. ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-6-432 (Michie
1993).
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system. Most of these grants are based upon a formula considering
such factors as the number of judges or courtrooms, or population.
California is the most prominent state that has adopted this approach; 88
however, the state's move to state funding occurred during a severe
budget crisis, delaying the implementation of the program. Block
grants have also been utilized in Pennsylvania 9 and Oregon. 90
Additionally, the Mississippi legislature approved a block grant
program for trial court personnel in 1993.91 The Administrative Office
of the Courts appropriated $40,000 for each trial judge, with the
judges given complete discretion as to the type and number of
employees to hire. 92 Judges are also given the discretion to join with
other judges and pool their funds and staff.93
In Arkansas, the most similar method of financing to the block
grant approach is the appropriation of county turnback funds, some
of which may be used to offset court related expenses. 94 Nothing
in that appropriation, however, requires that any such expenditures
actually occur.
The block grant approach allows a state to provide uniform
services statewide while allowing local officials, subject to general
parameters, to develop a system that best meets local needs.
Understandably, however, the state loses significant control and runs
the risk that funds could be misused or misappropriated for non-
court purposes.
D. Reimbursements
Reimbursement schemes often are utilized in states where the
local government bears the burden of court financing. Usually items
that are especially difficult for counties or are of a particular need
or interest to states are reimbursed. Examples include debt service
on buildings, costs for indigent defense, and expenses for juries. In
Arkansas, the state reimburses counties for one-half of the cost of
the judicial intake and probation officers' salaries, 95 and for some
of the expenses related to high cost criminal trials. 96
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 77200-77208 (West 1993).
89. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3502-3574 (1981 & Supp. 1994).
90. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 291.272-.290 (1993).
91. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 9-1-36 to -43 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
92. MIss. CODE ANN. § 9-1-36 (Supp. 1994).
93. Id.
94. ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-5-602 (Michie 1994). County aid appropriated by
the state in 1994-95 totaled $21,552,313. Act of Mar. 10, 1993, No. 417, § 1, 1993
Ark. Acts 679-A, 679-A.
95. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-327 to -328 (Michie 1994).
96. Appropriation Acts of Arkansas, 1993 Ark. Acts 76.
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Reimbursement programs allow the state to audit and, to a
large extent, control the local expenditure of funds, while providing
basic fiscal relief for the counties. A major disadvantage, however,
is that the plans have little effect on the inequities in the level of
services and programs available across the state. Many counties are
unable to make the initial expenditures that qualify for reimbursement,
particularly if the reimbursement is less than the full amount of the
expenditure .97
VII. POSSIBLE CHANGES FOR ARKANSAS
In light of litigation against the state by counties attempting to
force the state to assume the obligation of funding courts, combined
with litigation against municipalities alleging improper assessment of
court fees and surcharges, the time finally may be ripe for significant
change. This is further substantiated by the apparent agreement by
all parties that the current fee based system is flawed and a new
state centered approach is needed.
The current "politics" of the issue is fairly easy to discern.
There are five major interests, each of which is affected in different
ways by possible changes in the current system. The interested parties
include state, county, and city governments, current beneficiaries,
and judicial officials.
First, from a public policy standpoint, the state government has
the goal of creating a system that provides for a more uniform
system of justice across the state. To accomplish this through state
funding, new resources would be required at the state level. Un-
fortunately, it is unlikely that general revenue funds will ever increase
sufficiently or that new general revenue taxes will be approved for
the specific purpose of allowing the state to assume such a substantial
new responsibility. The state, therefore, is left with the option of
either increasing or redirecting special revenue sources, such as fees
and surcharges, or retaining a portion of county or city trnack
funds.
Second, for obvious reasons, the county government is willing
to divest itself of the responsibility of funding state trial courts.
97. The recent experience with the reimbursement program for juvenile intake
and probation officers' salaries demonstrates the difficulty many counties have with
the initial outlay of funds. The program reimburses, through the Administrative
Office of the Courts, the costs of 1/2 of each officer's salary, up to a maximum
of $15,000. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-327 to -328 (Michie 1994). The county,
however, must employ the officer for a full year in order to become eligible. See
id. §§ 16-13-327(d), -328(d). Many counties are unable to afford even this short-
term expense or are unable to match the remaining 1/2 of the salary.
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What is not apparent, however, is the extent to which the county
is willing to both give up court produced revenues to the state and
give up local control over decisions affecting the trial court system.
It is likely that counties will differ in their responses to these issues.
Third, Arkansas city governments probably will arise as the
most significant opponents to change, particularly if court fees and
surcharges are redirected to partially fund the state's new respon-
sibility. City general funds currently receive substantial revenues from
the operation of municipal and city courts while assuming very little
expense. In addition, those reform proposals that have been presented
to the state do not require the state to assume any of the costs of
operating limited jurisdiction courts. Cities, therefore, seem to have
little or nothing to gain.
Fourth, current beneficiaries of the fee based system have an
understandable interest in maintaining their current level of funding.
From a system perspective, however, the relationship between the
court system and the beneficiaries is, in some cases, tenuous at best.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that a state assumption of courts would
ever be undertaken without the use of at least a portion of these
funds. The sheer number of beneficiaries at both the state and local
levels and, in some instances, the political clout possessed by these
entities means that the development of a plan balancing these directly
opposing interests is imperative.
Finally, officials and employees of the judicial system also have
a stake in any changes to the system. In this regard, two issues are
of paramount importance. As mentioned previously, the definition
and scope of "the judicial system" will determine which parts of
the system are to be funded by the state. Decisions about which
personnel to include, ranging from public defenders to probation
officers, and which nonpersonnel items to include, such as operating
expenses and costs for equipment and facilities, will greatly affect
the form, structure, and extent of any state response. Considering
the great disparities in the current system, with well qualified and
well paid staff in some counties and little or no staff in others,
agreement upon a definition will produce both winners and losers
regardless of the system that is adopted.
E. Changing the Court Revenue System
While several specific problems with Arkansas's current fee and
surcharge scheme have been identified, two main objectives must be
at the forefront of any effort to reform the system: simplification
and uniformity. From the state's perspective, the easiest way to
achieve this goal would be to repeal all current fees and surcharges
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and replace them with flat fees to be assessed in all cases. Interestingly,
however, the application of this plan within the current structure
of Arkansas courts is impossible. The disparate nature of the systems
means that several different levels of government are involved in
the funding of all courts and in the collection and disbursement of
court fees and surcharges in all cases.
In 1993, the Arkansas General Assembly considered a bill that
would have established a uniform fee and surcharge and then disbursed
the revenues to one of three "court administration" funds, one at
each of the state, county, and city levels.98 From those central funds,
a percentage based allocation of total funds would have been directed
to each of the individuals or agencies receiving revenue from court
fees and surcharges." The intent of the plan was to set a uniform
fee statewide and simplify the system by providing only three points
of disbursement of court funds for court clerks.' ° The plan attempted
to assure that beneficiaries would receive at least the same level of
funding received the previous year.' °' Strong opposition from state
prosecutors and the two Arkansas law schools, both major beneficiaries
of court based fees, defeated the bill. They argued that there was
insufficient data to demonstrate that their funding would not decrease.
Although the bill was soundly defeated, the general structure
of a uniform fee, a central source of disbursement, and a percentage
allocation of revenue to beneficiaries was widely accepted. Further,
such a plan recently was adopted in Oregon and has since exhibited
great success. 0 2 The development of accurate data, the lack of which
was and remains the largest impediment to change in Arkansas, is
crucial to the reform. While the establishment of the Arkansas Court
Cost Commission'03 was for the express purpose of developing useful
data, the Commission has produced few results and made little
progress.
Any changes in the court revenue system should, at a minimum,
meet several goals and standards: (1) all individual surcharges should
98. H.R. 1871, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993). The legislation was sponsored by
Representative Mike Wilson, Vice-Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
Although amended six times in an effort to respond to concerns of opponents,




102. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.290-.309 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
103. Act of Apr. 26, 1993, No. 1305, 1993 Ark. Acts 4320. The legislation to
create the Commission was proposed by officials from the state's law schools as
an alternative to the uniform court cost legislation.
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be abolished; (2) uniform fees should be adopted by the General
Assembly, with local or optional fees prohibited; (3) fees should
not be so high as to preclude access to the courts and should not
be used as an alternative form of taxation; (4) the list of current
recipients of court fees and surcharges should be reviewed, fees
should be utilized to support courts or court related agencies, and
noncourt recipients should be removed; (5) all court fees should be
codified in one section of the state law to facilitate access and
understanding; (6) all courts should utilize a uniform system of
financial record keeping in which records are maintained on all
revenues collected and disbursed, and reported to a state-level entity;
and (7) court financial records should be subject to a separate and
timely state audit, at least biennially.
F. Changing the Court Financing System
The realities of state and local politics, the availability of state
revenue, and the inevitable fear of and resistance to change suggest
that the state will not immediately assume the costs of the entire
state court system. In fact, the divided structure of our court system
makes this change not only impossible, but ill-advised.
Since 1970, three attempts have been made to consolidate court
structure and administration in the state. The proposed constitutions
of 19701° and 1980,10 5 as well as the proposed judicial article considered
by the General Assembly in 1991,' °6 all envisioned a fully unified
and centralized court structure. While state court financing was not
mentioned in any of the three proposals, the funding was expected
to be driven by the centralized structure.
With the abandonment of efforts toward structural improvement,
the emphasis now has been placed upon state funding, with the
hope that the funding can "drive" changes in the structure.
Nevertheless, even though state funding cannot cure certain
104. ARK. CONST. of 1970 (proposed draft); see Ronald L. Boyer, A New Judicial
System for Arkansas, 24 ARK. L. REV. 221 (1970).
105. ARK. CONST. of 1980 (proposed draft).
106. See JUDICIAL ARTICLE TASK FORCE, ARKANSAS JUDICIAL PLANNING COMM.
& NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ARKANSAS FUNDAMENTAL COURT IMPROVEMENT
PROJECT: A FINAL REPORT (1979). In 1991 the Arkansas Bar Association developed,
as a part of its legislative package, a proposed judicial article to the Arkansas
Constitution and sought to have the issue referred to a public vote by the General
Assembly. Senate Joint Resolution 10 of 1991 of the Arkansas General Assembly
was one of the amendments referred by the Joint State Agencies and Governmental
Affairs Committee for full consideration by the House and Senate. The proposal
was approved by the Senate in an altered form but was narrowly defeated in the
House.
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constitutional deficiencies, it can improve a large number of problems
that are not the result of an outdated constitution. For instance,
the state currently has 127 municipal courts and 93 city courts served
by some 179 part-time judges. The courts possess overlapping
jurisdiction and some counties are served by as many as a dozen
courts.10 7 If the state assumed the costs of limited jurisdiction court
expenses, the structure of the courts could be unified, the case loads
equalized, and the courts serviced by full-time judges. No constitutional
change would be required to accomplish these improvements; yet
without an incentive such as state funding, it is unlikely that these
changes would occur.
State funding may not initially affect limited jurisdiction courts,
but numerous examples of structural and personnel inefficiencies
exist at the trial court level. If the prosecution function is included
under the definition of a state funded court system, for example,
substantial changes in the personnel structure would be required. In
1991, Arkansas was served by some 144 deputy prosecutors, most
of whom were part-time employees. 08 Moreover, the number of
deputies serving counties ranged from zero in five counties to twenty-
two in Pulaski County.' 9 Additionally, the leave time, benefits
packages, and other personnel related issues for the employees differed
greatly from county to county." 0 Moving to state funding of salaries
for deputy prosecutors does not mean that the current structure and
cost simply will be shifted to the state. A requirement of full-time,
minimally qualified employees should be adopted, with the distribution
of employees clear and consistent.
Because such personnel changes will produce resistance and
require time, less than full state funding on a centralized basis should
be considered. Accordingly, the House of Delegates of the Arkansas
Bar Association is considering a block grant method of state funding
that is partially a proposal modeled after the program adopted in
Mississippi." Unider t -----. progra. rathe sp
107. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ARKANSAS JUDICIARY ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1992-1993 (1993).
108. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CURRENT AND PROPOSED STAFFING
ASSISTANCE FOR ARKANSAS TRIAL COURTS (1992).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Three bills have been referred to the Arkansas Bar Association's House of
Delegates by the Committee for a Modern Judiciary, cochaired by Judge John
Lineberger and former Judge Elizabeth Danielson. Included in the package are a
bill for uniform costs and fees, a bill to provide state funding, and a bill to
improve the collection of court fines. The court cost and fine collection bills would,
among other things, direct substantial portions of cost and fine revenues to the
state to provide for state funding of the court system.
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number of deputy prosecutors, for example, a central appropriation
would be made to the Prosecution Coordinator Commission, a state
level entity, for the salaries of deputy prosecutors. The Commission
would have the responsibility of distributing the positions around
the state, based upon the requests of prosecuting attorneys. A separate
appropriation act sets a uniform salary and controls the total amount
of money available. Individual counties may use county funds to
supplement salaries or to provide for additional employees.
The proposal creates a structure for a phased-in approach, where
the state can assume a greater percentage of costs over a number
of years. During the phase-in, though, the state resources are delivered
on an equitable and consistent basis. This approach also allows the
state to contribute to the costs of the whole court system, however
defined, rather than having to choose, for example, between the
total funding of deputy prosecutors and no funding for public
defenders.
Any changes in the court financing system should, at a minimum,
meet several goals and standards: (1) the scope and definition of
the state court system, for purposes of state financing, should be
clearly identified; (2) the state should continue to finance those parts
of the state court system that it currently finances and approach
total state funding of all court personnel and major operations; (3)
local governments should continue to be responsible for court facilities,
equipment, and office supplies, but the state should adopt minimum
standards for these items; (4) the state should provide job descriptions,
minimum qualifications, and uniform salaries for all classifications
of court personnel; (5) to enhance local control and effectiveness,
the decision to hire and fire particular employees and to oversee
employees should be left to local court officials; (6) state appropriations
for court employees should be made to state level agencies to insure
compliance with state standards and to provide equity within the
state in the provision of resources; (7) the state should utilize general
revenue funds to assume additional state court financing and, while
court produced revenues should be redirected as state general revenue,
neither courts nor other specific court functions should be operated
from proceeds produced from court fees or surcharges; and (8) the
state should consider a combination of court produced fees, a partial
reduction in turnback funds provided to local government, and an
additional amount of general funds as a means of providing for
the state funding of the court system.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of state funding of the Arkansas court system has
reached a pivotal time and is ripe for consideration by the Arkansas
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General Assembly. Although there is disagreement over the details
of the proposal, there is general agreement for the first time on the
need for state funding and its resulting benefits.
Successful implementation of the plan will require a clear def-
inition of the scope of the problem. In addition, a lack of information
and data, insufficient coordination and cooperation, inadequate funds,
negative attitudes and resistance to change, and inadequate lead time
have all been cited as major hurdles by other states that have gone
through the transition."12 Hopefully, the information contained in
this article responds to these problems and can benefit those who
will debate the possibility of state court financing for Arkansas,
producing a judicial system that is both fairer and more efficient
for all Arkansans.
112. LARRY BERKSON & SUSAN CARBON, COURT UNIFICATION: HISTORY, POLITICS
AND IMPLEMENTATION 171 (1978).
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TABLE 1: STATE FUNDING OF TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION'
Court All Oher e cn. Operating
State Judiciary Reporters Personnel Capital Equip. Real Property Travel Expenses
Alabama 2 X X X X X
Alaska X X X X X X
Arizona
Arkansas X X x
California'
Colorado X X X X X X
Connecticut X X X X X X X
Delaware X X X X X X X




Hawaii X X X X X X x
Idaho X X .5 X
Illinois X X X X
Indiana X X X
Iowa X X X X X X x
Kansas X X X X
Kentucky x x X X X X X
Louisiana X
Maine X X x x x X
Maryland X X
Massachusetts x x x X X X x
Michigan ,___
Minnesota X X X X
Mississippi X X .1 X
Missouri X X X X
Montana X X
Nebraska x X X
Nevada X X
Ncw X X X X x x X
Hampshirc
New Jersey X X X
Nec Mexico X X X X X X
Nw York X X X X X X X
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Court I All Other I I [c. Operutig
State Judiciary Reporers Personnel Capital Equip. Real Property Travel Expenscn
North Carolina X X X X X X
North Dakota X X X X X X
Ohio X
Oklahoma X X X X
Oregon X X X X X X
Pennsylvania X
Rhode Island x X X X X X X
South Carolina X X X
South Dakota X X X X X X
Tcnnessee X X X
Texas'
Utah X X X X X X X
Vermont X X X X X X X
Virginia X x
Washington
West Virginia X X X
Wisconsin X X X
Wyoming X X
' Compiled from OSTROM ET At.. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS. 1993 STATE COURT ORGANIZATION (1994). As
used above. Judiciary. Cr. Reporters, and All Other Personnel includes salary and fringe; Capitol Equip. covers items such as
computers, typewriters. and copiers; Real Property refers to land and capital construction; and Gen. Operating Expenses includes
utilities, supplies, and building rental. -X" indicates total state funding "*" indicates that the corresponding note should be
referenced.
2 Counties supplement basic state salary.
3 Uses electronic recording rather than reporters.
4 Legislation has been approved for phase in of full state funding.
5 Computer system only.
6 State pays approximately 90%.
7 Legislation provides 4.000 per judge for staff support.
9 State pays approximately 92%. with local supplements.
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TABLE 2: APPROPRIATIONS FOR ARKANSAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM - 1993-94'
AGENCY GENERAL I SPECIAL FEDERAL CASH TRUST TOTAL
SUPREME COURT 3,153.532 3,153.532
COURT OF 2.301,927 2,301,927
APPEALS





ADMIN OFFICE OF 2,720,087 25,000 181.163 2.926.250
COURTS




ATTORNEY 5.752.298 2.913,737 1.251.396 240,000 10.157.431
GENERAL














TOTALS 30.141,457 8,709.818 2.557,559 240,000 100.000 41,748,834
TOTAL STATE
OPERATING 4.088,491.755 1,055,032,639 612.178.932 1,956.393.986 1,333.151,663 9.291,684.941
APPROPRIATIONS
PERCENTAGE
ALLOCATED TO .7372% .8255% .4178% .0123% .0075% .4493%
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
lSource: Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration.
2Administcred by Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration.
3Administcred by Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration.
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TABLE 3: CURRENT ARKANSAS COURT FEES AND SURCHARGES[ FEE TYPE ARK. CODE ANN. §I AMOUNT JCTTYPEICASE TYPVi[M/0I PAYEE BENEFITTED
Code Revision 1-2-306 $0.25 C.Ch.P.Mu Cv.F.Msd.V.Or M Stale Treasurer Code Revision
Fund
Drug Abuse 5-64-416 S250.00 (f) C.Mu,Cy, Offenses in M Prosecuting Prosecuting
Prevention 5100.00 (M) Pol 5-64-101. Coordinator (325). Coord. DADAP




Drug Abuse 5-64-709 S50.00 C.Mu."or Offenses in M County & Mun. Cities &
other court' 5-64-4 0 1(c) Treasurer, then 1/2 Counties ACIC
(Cy.Pol) to DFA
DWI 5-65-113 5250.00 C.Mu.Pol, DWI M DFA ($150), Highay Saldty
16-17-110 Cy 5-65-103 City/County (AIITD) State




DWl/llighway 5-65-115 3200.00 C.Mu.Cy. Contempt Ior M Mun. Ct. (550). Mun. Ct.





Underage 5-65-307 5200.00 Mu,Cy.Pol Contempt lor M Mun. Ct. (S50). Mun. Ci.





Legal Educ. 6-64-603 55.00 C.Ch.P.Mu. F.Msd.Trf.V, M UA Bd. of GAF & IJALR
Pol.Cy Or.Cv Trustees Law Schools
Jail Building 12-41-617 <$10.00 CCh.P.Mu, FMsd.Trf.V. 0 County Treasurer Counts Jail
Bonds Pol.Cy Or
Public Delender 14-20-102 55.00 C.Ch.P.Mu. Cv Filings M County Treasurer Count% (110%)
Cy.Pol State P.O. (20%)
C.Mu,Cv. F.Msd.Trf.V,
Pol Or
14-20-102(d) $5.00 Same as Same as above 0 Same as above County
above
(ame La" 15-41-204 310.00 Mu.C Game la M Prosecutor Prosecutor
Prosecutions offenses
15-42-121 525.00 JP Same as Same as above M Same as above Same as above
310.00 C above
IUniforot 16-14-105 575.00 P P M County Treasurer Counts
Advance Fee
Intoxication 16-17-109 $1.00 Mu Pub. 0 County Treasurer. City or County
Equip. 55.00 Intoxication City Treasurer Intoxication
(51.00) Equip. Fund
DWI (55.00)
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FEE A .CODE A . AMOUNT CT. TYPE' CASE TYPE IM/0I PAYEE BENEFITED
Man. Ct. Admin. 16-17-111 5$5.00 Mu,Cy,Pol Msd,Trf.V.Or 0 City Treasurer City and/or
County
Judicial 16-17-112 $3.00 Mu Trf (excluding M APERS State Treasury
Retirement parking for Const.




Admin. of 16-17-113 <$3.00 Mu,Cy Msd,TrfV,Or 0 City or County City and/or
Justice Treasurer County
Mun. Ct. Educ. 16-17-123 $0.25 Mu Cv M AOC AOC
Pretrial Release 16-17-125 not specified Mu,Cy F.Msd 0 City Treasurer City
Intra-Coutny 16-17-402 S20.00 Mu Cv.Msd,Trf, 0 City Treasurer Cit
Mun. Ct. V.Or
Agreements
Mun. Ct. Filings 16-17-705 S10.00 Mu Cv <1,000 M City Treasurer City
$30.00 Mu Cv >1.000 and M
<3.000
Victim/Witness 16-21-106 d5.00 C,Ch.Mu. CvFMsd.Trf. 0 County Treasurer Prosecutor
CyPol V.Or Victim/Witness
Prosecutor 16-21-113(f) $0.50 C.Mu FMsd 0 County Treasurer Prosecutor
Coordinator Coordinator
County Law 16-23-103 >$1.00 C,Mu.Pol. F.CVMsd 0 County Treasurer County Law
Library <$3.00 CyCh.P (excluding Library
parking)
P.D. Investigator 16-87-111 <34.00 C.Mu.Pol. F.Msd.Trf.V. 0 County Treasurer County
Cy Or
Crime Victim 16-90-718 120.00(f C.Mu.Cy. F.Msd.V.Or M DF&A A.G. Crime
Reparations 110.00(m) Pal Victim Rtp.
I I Fund
State Police 16-92-110(a) $5.00 C F.Msd.TrfV, M County Treasurer State Police
Retirment Or Retirement
$3.00 Mu.Cy.Pol
Police Pension 16-92-110(b) $1.00 MuCy.Pol Msd 0 City Treasurer of Police Pension
Employing Officer Fund or Police
Benefit Fund
Crime 16-92-116 $1.00 C.Mu.Pol. FMsd. M DFA Ark. Counties
Prevention Cy Moving Trf Crime
Prevention Fund
Health Filing 20-7-123 $2.00 P Adoption M State Treasurer Public Health
Fees 20-18-405 Fund
20-18-502 $1.00 Ch Divorce M State Treasurer Public Health
Fund
App. Filing Fees 21-6-401 $100.00 SCCA Cv,Msd M SC Library. Fund SC Library
Appeals
$25.00 SC Petitions for
ReviewI
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FEE TYPE JAti. CODE ANN. § J C [CASE 1YPV IN IV PAYEE BENEFTTTED




C1. Reporter 21-6-404 $20.00 C.Ch.P New causes of M County Treasurer State Treasurer
16-20-107 action and Ct. Reporter
reopenings in Fund
Ch. Ct. (less: 2% for
City Treasurer,





Prosecuting 21-6-410 $5.00 C.Mu.Pol, State/County M Prosecutor Prosecutor





City Attorney $5.00 MuPol'Cy Msd.Or City Treasurer City
$10.00
$25.00
Prosecuting 21-6-411 >55.00 CMu Cases under 5- M Prosecutor Prosecutor




Justice Bldg. 22-3-920 S1.00 C F.Msd M County Treasurer Justice Bldg.
Fund
$1.00 C.Ch.P All civil filings






Police & Fire 27-50-401 $3.00 MuCy.Pol Trf(operation M City Treasurer Police Pension
Retirement of motor Fund
vehicle).Or
IKes: C = Circuit. CA = Court of Appeals: Ch = Chancer': Cy = City: Mu = Municipal (including small claims) P = Probate
Pot = Police: SC = Supreme Court
2Key: Cv =Civil: F = Felony: Or = Local Ordinance Violatio: Msd = Mislemeanor, Trf = Traffic: V = Violation of State Law
t
Key: M =Mundatory: 0 = Optional
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TABLE 4: LOCAL FEES AND SURCHARGES IN ARKANSAS
REFERENCE LOCATION J AMOUNT PURPOSE
Act 472 of 1981 Pulaski $5 County Jail Fund
Act 958 of 1981 Logan $5 Unspecified
Act 989 of 1981 Saline $5 County Jail Fund
Act 576 of 1983 Arkansas <$5 Public Defender Fund
Act 607 of 1983 Phillips <$5 Public Defender Fund
Act 682 of 1983 Lee <$5 Public Defender Fund
Act 919 of 1983 Crittenden <$5 Public Defender Fund
Act 972 of 1981 St. Francis <$5 Public Defender Fund
Act 610 of 1983 Pulaski $2 Public Defender Fund
Act 335 of 1983 Little River, Sevier, Howard $10 Deputy Prosecutor
Act 485 of 1983 Pope, Johnson, Franklin <$15 Prosecuting Attorney
Act 311 of 1981 Miller $5 Unspecified
Act 978 of 1981 Craighead $5 Criminal Justice
Act 685 of 1971 Greene, Independence, Ouachita, St. $1 County Law Library




ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92-111 Pulaski $5 - $75 County General Fund
(Prosecutor)
Act 1150 of 1991 Boone > $350 County General Fund (Public
Defender)
Act 442 of 1989 Jackson $15 County Treasury (Public
Defender)
ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-8-303(h) Chicot, Ashley, Columbia $1 Municipal Judge Retirement
ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-8-402(a) Pulaski $0.20 Municipal Judge Retirement
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-108 Grant, City of Sheridan $2 - $10 Municipal Clerk, Deputy
Prosecutor
Act 803 of 1983 Craighead $5 County Jail
Act 300 of 1983 City of Van Buren $1 Unspecified
Act 4 of 1983 Pulaski $5 or $10 Prosecuting Attorney
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-402 Two cities in same county without a $20 City Treasury
nun. ct.
Act 1149 of 1991 City of Wynne $3 Municipal Court Retirement
ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-8-315 County with two dists. and two $1 -$5 Municipal Court Retirement
county seats
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-50-401 Ist and 2nd class cities $3 Police Pension Fund
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REFERENCE j LOCATION AMOUNT PURPOSE
AIK. CODE ANN. 14-20-115 Pulaski, Benton, Craighead, <50% of all County General Fund
Garland. Jefferson, Sebastian. other fees
Washington
Act 398 of 1989 Baxter County <$350 Public Defender System
Act 322 of 1987 Mississippi County ._S$10 Public Defender
Act 349 of 1989 Poinsett S$5 Public Defender
Act 543 of 1987 Miller $1 Trf. $3 County General
Crim
Act 782 of 1987 Little River S2Trf, $5 County/City General
Crim
Act 255 of 1989 Cross <$5 Juvenile Court Staff
Act 851 of 1987 Cities of Hamburg and Crossett $2 Crossett & Ashley County
Historical Soc'y
Act 311 of 1993 City of Augusta $4 Municipal Court Retirement
